Hybrid Signatures

Hybrid Signatures

Every offer and every answer of a call handshake carries two signatures at once: ML-DSA-87 (FIPS 204, NIST level 5) and Ed25519. To forge a handshake, both have to be broken.

ML-DSA-87 · FIPS 204Ed25519NIST level 5Renewals signed

Two signatures on every handshake

ML-DSA-87 and Ed25519 sign the same message: the hash of the handshake transcript, both public keys, the fingerprint of the call certificate and the capabilities announced. This holds for every offer and answer, and for every key renewal during the call.

  • Hybrid signature of 4691 bytes: 4627 of ML-DSA-87 and 64 of Ed25519
  • ML-DSA-87 public key of 2592 bytes
  • Renewals signed like the first handshake

Valid only if both verify

A signature is accepted only when the post-quantum one and the classical one both verify over the same message. Ed25519 follows a strict rule that rejects non-canonical keys and points of small order. Breaking one scheme is not enough to forge a handshake.

  • Both signatures verified over the same message
  • Strict Ed25519 verification
  • Shared test vectors for the whole scheme

A post-quantum key for every device

Each device holds one ML-DSA-87 key, derived from the identity of the device: there is no new secret to store. The two keys certify each other, the server checks that certification when the key is published, and the key is recorded in a transparency log.

  • One ML-DSA-87 key per device, derived from its identity
  • Cross-certification between the two keys
  • A contact's key is remembered at its first valid signature; a later change shows a visible warning

Capabilities cannot be downgraded

The capabilities announced by each side are bound into the key confirmation of the handshake, so removing one on the way makes the confirmation fail and the call closes. A capability already seen on a device is remembered. There is one handshake format; the older ones are gone.

  • Capabilities bound to the key confirmation
  • A capability already seen cannot be dropped silently
  • A single handshake format

Frequently asked questions

Why sign twice?

Ed25519 is fast and long proven. ML-DSA-87 adds a signature designed to hold against a quantum computer. A handshake is accepted only if both verify, so a forger has to break both.

How big is a hybrid signature?

4691 bytes: 4627 for ML-DSA-87 and 64 for Ed25519. The ML-DSA-87 public key is 2592 bytes.

Do the signatures cover key renewals?

Yes. Every offer and answer is signed, including the rounds that renew the keys during a call.