Call Encryption

Two layers. Two key exchanges.

Every call is protected by two independent layers of encryption. Each is born from its own hybrid post-quantum key exchange, and every handshake is sealed by a hybrid signature.

ML-KEM-1024 + X25519AES-256-GCMML-DSA-87 + Ed25519Blind relay

Two independent layers

One call. Two layers of encryption.

Two independent layers, two hybrid key exchanges, one signed handshake. The relay forwards ciphertext and derives no key.

Two layers, two key exchanges

The inner layer comes from a first key exchange that combines ML-KEM-1024 (FIPS 203, NIST level 5) with X25519. The outer layer comes from a second exchange, run with fresh keys of the same kind. Voice and video travel encrypted with AES-256-GCM inside both layers.

  • ML-KEM-1024 + X25519, twice per call
  • New key pairs for every exchange
  • AES-256-GCM on each layer, with 32-byte keys

An outer layer that needs both secrets

The outer key is derived with HKDF-SHA-256 from the secret of the second exchange together with the session key of the first. Whoever holds only one of the two learns nothing about the outer layer.

  • Second-exchange secret: 32 bytes from ML-KEM-1024 plus 32 bytes from X25519
  • Outer key bound to the session key of the first exchange
  • Replay protection on the outer layer, with a window of 1024 frames

Separate keys for audio, video and each direction

Audio and video never share a key, and neither do the two directions of the call. Keys of the inner layer are bound to the call, to the renewal round and to the media type, so a key made for one stream cannot open another.

  • One key for each media type and each direction
  • Keys bound to the call and to the renewal round
  • Audio sealed in blocks of constant size, 256 bytes

Renewed at most every 5 minutes, and chained

A call renews its keys with a complete new key exchange at most every five minutes, and sooner when the confidence index on the voice drops. Every renewal is chained to the previous one: the keys of a round depend on the rounds before it.

  • Base period of 5 minutes, shortened by the voice confidence index
  • Immediate renewal when the index falls below 0.5
  • Private keys of a round erased as soon as the round ends

A relay that only forwards ciphertext

Between the two devices the relay sees opaque blocks and nothing else. It derives no key, and the metadata of the frames sit inside the outer layer. Session keys exist only in the memory of the devices and are never written to disk.

  • The relay derives no key
  • Frame metadata protected by the outer layer
  • Session keys live in device memory only

Verify who is on the line

Each call uses a new certificate, bound to the signed handshake, so it can never be reused or swapped. A code of six words, 48 bits, shown on both devices confirms the other party. The caller commits to the code in advance, so an intermediary has one chance in 281 trillion per attempt.

  • New certificate for every call, never reused
  • Six words from a list of 256: 48 bits
  • The code is committed before it is revealed

Frequently asked questions

What does the second layer add?

An independent secret. The outer layer is derived from a second ML-KEM-1024 + X25519 exchange and from the session key of the first, so it needs both. The relay forwards blocks protected by both layers and reads none of them.

How often do the keys change?

At most every five minutes, with a complete new key exchange, and sooner when the confidence index on the voice drops. Each renewal is bound to the previous one.

How do the two parties know nobody is in the middle?

Every handshake is signed with ML-DSA-87 and Ed25519, the certificate of the call is new and bound to the signed handshake, and a code of six words shown on both devices confirms the other party.