Why hardware isolation instead of just better software?

If the operating system can read the microphone, any spyware that gets root on the OS can read the microphone too. Hardware isolation binds the microphone bus to the Secure World at boot — the Normal World OS literally cannot reconfigure it.

What is the DMA Air-Gap?

DMA Air-Gap is our patent-pending pattern (UIBM 2026, Patent #1) for binding peripheral DMA descriptors to the Secure World at first boot. The peripheral does not appear as a device to the Normal World. It is the architectural backbone of Q-AUDION's anti-interception guarantee.

Why ML-KEM-1024 and not just AES?

AES is a symmetric cipher — both parties need the same key. ML-KEM-1024 is the key-encapsulation mechanism that lets two parties agree on that AES key without an attacker (even a future quantum one) being able to recover it. Both are used together.

Is the wire identical across Android, iOS, and Desktop?

Yes — byte-identical. We enforce this in CI via Known-Answer-Test vectors that all three platforms must pass before any release.

Technology · Key Management

Sovereign by design. Your keys, not ours.

Our Key Management System custodies opaque containers — never their contents. The master key lives in your hands, attested by hardware, verified by you, forever outside our operator perimeter.

Sovereign Key Management

The vault that cannot look inside itself.

Customer

Master Key · BYOK

Opaque container vault

KMS Vault

HSM-attested · door opens outward only

Ciphertext out

Opaque · Unreadable

Customer holds the master key. Always.

Server custodies opaque containers. Never the contents.

Zero-knowledge by design. HSM-attested. BYOK available.

The vault door opens only toward the customer. Even a fully compromised server operator cannot derive plaintext — the unwrapping key exists only in the customer's hands and inside attested HSM boundaries.

HSM Attestation

Hardware-Rooted Trust, Not Operator Promises

Every key operation is attested by a hardware security module. Each unwrap or signing event produces a cryptographic statement bound to the HSM firmware version, the operator identity, and the policy that authorized the action. Customers verify these attestations independently — trust is not granted to us, it is measured.

FIPS 140-3 Level 2 target with tamper-evident hardware boundaries
Per-operation signed attestations, exportable for audit
Quorum-based administrative ceremonies, no single-operator override

BYOK · Key Wrapping

Bring Your Own Key. Wrap Ours With Yours.

Customers generate the master key on their own HSM or air-gapped ceremony, then wrap our data-encryption keys with it. The wrapping key never leaves the customer perimeter. Even with full administrative access to our infrastructure, no operator can produce plaintext without an active customer-side unwrap call.

PKCS#11 / KMIP-compatible wrapping protocols
Hybrid post-quantum wrapping (ML-KEM + AES-256-GCM)
Customer revocation = immediate, irreversible, server-side

Zero-Knowledge Custody

The Vault Door Opens Outward, Never Inward

Encrypted containers enter the KMS. Encrypted containers leave the KMS. Nothing inside the server can derive their plaintext. Our control plane authorizes container movement and access policy; the data plane never sees keys in the clear. Forward-secret session keys are ephemeral and HSM-bound.

Zero-knowledge architecture: server compromise ≠ data compromise
Forward-secret session protocol with ephemeral DH exchange
No backdoors, no master-recovery, no escrow surface

Sigsum Key Transparency

Identity Keys in a Verifiable Public Log

Every identity public key Q-Audion mints is appended to a Sigsum transparency log — modeled on Certificate Transparency for the web. Any client can audit the log and detect a server attempting to inject a malicious key into a conversation. Trust is observable, not promised: a malicious server cannot silently swap an identity key without leaving a public, append-only record.

Verifiable append-only log of identity public keys
Clients detect key swaps independently of the server
Sealed Sender envelope hides sender identity from the server itself

3-Factor Trust Model

TOFU + INTRODUCED + VERIFIED

Contact trust is not binary. Q-Audion assigns one of three levels: TOFU (Trust On First Use — observed but unverified), INTRODUCED (vouched for by an already-trusted contact), VERIFIED (out-of-band fingerprint match). UI surfaces the level for every call; the protocol degrades gracefully when any single factor is undermined. Combined with hardware-rooted key custody and Sigsum transparency, an attacker needs to compromise all three independent dimensions to escalate impersonation.

TOFU — observed key, surfaced in UI as unverified
INTRODUCED — vouched by a contact already at VERIFIED
VERIFIED — out-of-band fingerprint match, highest tier

See the threat model. Audit the boundary.

Engineering teams and procurement reviewers can request the full KMS technical brief, including HSM attestation flows and BYOK ceremony scripts.

Request the KMS technical brief